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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
On November 14, 2001 the 142 Members of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") successfully concluded their 4 h Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar by agreeing to launch a new round of trade
negotiations. The Doha Ministerial Declaration provides a mandate for
negotiations on twenty-one subjects, including topics already under
negotiation and new disciplines for possible future implementation.1 The
Doha agenda represents an aggressive attempt to conclude negotiations on
difficult existing topics, to consider new disciplines and to address
"outstanding implementation issues" in an effort to "rebalance the rights
and obligations nations assumed as part of the Uruguay Round package.
Particularly intriguing are efforts to reach a single undertaking on services
*LL.M., with distinction, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC (2004); J.D.,
cum laude, Loyola University School of Law, New Orleans, LA (1998). The author
gratefully acknowledges the invaluable comments of Professor Terence P. Stewart and Don
Wallace, Jr. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Matthew M. McCormick.
'Negotiations on agriculture and services had already begun in 2000. New topics
include trade and investment, trade and competition policy, transparency in government
procurement and trade facilitation. Trade and the environment is another notable inclusion.
See Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)IDEC/I (Nov. 20, 2001)[hereinafter Doha
Ministerial Declaration].
2 TERENCE P. STEWART, AFTER DOHA, THE CHANGING ATTrIUDE & IDEAS OF THE NEW
WTO ROUND 1(2002).
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by January 1, 2005, and negotiations on the relationship between existing
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")/WTO rules and trade
obligations contained in multilateral environmental agreements. In
addition to the broad topical agenda, the Doha Ministerial concluded the
accession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO.4
Unfortunately, the promise of Doha remained unfulfilled, after the 5
h
Ministerial Conference in Cancun, Mexico ended in acrimony, particularly
with respect to the agriculture and Singapore issues.5 Despite the failure of
Cancun, recent events indicate a renewed effort to invigorate the stalled
Doha agenda and a willingness to re-engage the multilateral process.6 To
the extent the Doha agenda is resuscitated, and the WTO attempts to
commit more complex and politically sensitive issues to supranational
governance, the WTO must address the fundamental issue of how the new
trade agenda impacts the oft-debated question of sovereignty. Some of the
disciplines currently under debate have the potential to upset the balance
struck between Member sovereignty and the supranational authority
necessary to regulate the massive undertaking concluded in the Uruguay
Round. This balance is particularly at risk due to the possible addition of
new disciplines that not only have implications for nation/state sovereignty
but also the autonomy of regional and local governments within Members
employing federal or federal-like forms of government.7
3 The Doha Declaration Explained, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dda e/dohaexplained e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
4 See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 1.
5 See Day 5: Conference ends without consensus, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/minist-e/min03_e/min03_14septe.htm (Sept. 14, 2003). The Cancun
Ministerial was marked by a group of 20 developing countries, the so-called "G-20,"
demanding greater access and removal of trade barriers and domestic support systems in
agriculture.
6 See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, A Common-Sense Approach to Advance
the Doha Development Agenda, (Jan. 12, 2004) available at http://www.ustr.gov/wto/ 2004-
01- 12-doha-advance.pdf.
7 For example, completion of a single package on international trade in services raises
concerns regarding political autonomy and sovereignty. Services necessarily involve a high
degree of regional and local regulation which raises the stakes in the effort to transfer
services to the international arena. See Tycho H.E. Stahl, Liberalizing International Trade
in Services: The Casefor Sidestepping the GATT, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 405, 410 (1994);
Matthew Schaefer, Note on State Involvement in Trade Negotiations, the Development of
Trade Agreement Legislation, and the Administration of Trade Agreements, in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 137-139 (John H. Jackson et al. eds.,
2002).
Another example is trade and the environment. Many regional and local governments
retain the ability to impose environmental regulations which go beyond national
requirements. These regulations could have potentially negative implications on various
aspects of trade liberalization. See e.g., Terence P. Stewart, The Uruguay Round Agreements
Act: An Overview of Major Issues and Potential Trouble Spots in THE WORLD TRADE
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Sovereignty is a delicate subject traditionally invoked by opponents of
trade liberalization as justification for protectionist policies that thwart the
goals of the GATT/WTO.8  The progressive nature of the current trade
agenda has engendered a new round of sovereignty debate in the United
States, with critics of the international trade system becoming more vocal
due to the largest trade deficit in American history and a significant decline
in domestic manufacturing jobs.9 As if the issues weren't sufficiently
volatile in their own right, the debate occurs during a United States
Presidential election year in which international trade, and the loss of
manufacturing jobs associated with it, is a prominent campaign issue.10
While most of the current sovereignty debate among United States
scholars focuses on the nation/state and its relation to the world trade
system, the relationship between regional and local autonomy and the world
trade system has largely been ignored." This omission is likely based on
the assumption that United States federalism in the international arena is a
dead letter. 12 However, traditional notions of sovereignty are changing to
ORGANIZATION, THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 2 1ST CENTURY AND U.S.
IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 5, 30-31 (Terence P. Stewart, ed.).
8 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
9 The United States 2003 trade deficit registered a record $489.4 billion, 17.1% larger
than the previous record 2002 shortfall of $418 billion. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Econ. and
Statistics Admin., U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. International
Trade in Goods and Services, (Dec. 2003) available at http://www.bea.gov/beal
newsrelarchive/2004/tradl203.pdf'. The 2003 Economic Report of the President indicates a
16% decline in manufacturing jobs from June 2000 to December 2003, the largest decline
since 1960. 2003 EcoN. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H. Doc. No. 108-145, at 56 (2003).
10 Some parties to the Presidential election debate have called for a wholesale re-
assessment of all international trade agreements and a possible requisite inclusion of labor
and environmental standards in future trade negotiations and agreements. See e.g., A Plan
For Free And Fair Trade, available at http://www.johnkerry.com/issues/economy/trade.html
(calling for 120 day review of all existing trade agreements) (last visited Mar. 13, 2004).
The volatile nature of international trade debate during an election year became readily
apparent after the release of the 2003 Economic Report of the President. See 2003 EcON.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 9. The chairman of the White House Council of
Economic Advisers attempted to explain the loss of manufacturing jobs by alluding to the
economic theory of comparative advantage and the loss of jobs as only "the latest
manifestation of the gains from trade that economists have talked about" for years. While
the theory of comparative advantage remains debatable, particularly in light of cross-border
free movement of factors of production, but for the fact that this is an election year the
statement likely would not have garnered much press. However, the issue has launched
international trade to the center of the 2004 Presidential election debate. See Jonathan
Weisman, Bush, Adviser Assailed for Stance on 'Offshoring' Jobs, THE WASH. POST, Feb.
11, 2004, at A6.
11 See generally Spiro, infra note 41.
12 Most constitutional scholars emphasize the federal government's exclusive
constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce which presumptively preempts any
contrary state regulations. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
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include a greater role for regional and local governments in foreign
affairs.' 3 Equally important, and perhaps causally linked to the changing
nature of sovereignty, is the continuing evolution of the federal distribution
of powers over foreign affairs, particularly in the United States. The United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board4 and Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council15 have reignited the
constitutional debate regarding federal/state distribution of authority over
foreign affairs. Some constitutional scholars believe Barclays, Crosby and
other recent Supreme Court cases leave the door open for a resurgence of
state participation in matters implicating foreign affairs.' 6
The new trade agenda unmistakably implicates regional and local
autonomy as current and future WTO disciplines reach further and deeper
into areas regulated by subfederal governmental units. The WTO also faces
potentially immense challenges with respect to actions taken at the
provincial level in China. While China's central government undoubtedly
has the ability to preempt provincial actions, no one can predict how
China's legal system will interface with the WTO, particularly in light of
the fact that China is utilizing WTO membership as a springboard for
fundamental structural change in its political and economic systems.
17
Russia's future accession raises similar concerns as its unsettled
constitutional system develops.
All of the aforementioned developments require a critical re-
assessment of how the WTO addresses the regional and local governments
of its Members. The key question is whether the WTO is capable of
responding to an increase in non-conforming measures enacted by regional
and local governments. After the enactment of the GATT, one prominent
scholar described this question in the context of the United States' federal
system as "whether the General Agreement actually obligates the federal
government to make state governments comply with GATT rules. If not,
then state laws inconsistent with GATT rules will not actually be in conflict
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 117 (2002) ("It is reasonably well-established today
that the federal government has supremacy, if it chooses to exercise it, over almost all issues
that have any commercial overtones.") [hereinafter JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS]; Robert E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the
Domestic Law of the United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 187, 219
(Meinhard Hilf et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter Hudec, The Legal Status of GA T]; Kenneth J.
Cooper, To Compel or Encourage: Seeking Compliance with International Trade
Agreements at the State Level, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 143, 144-45 (1993).
13 See Spiro infra note 41; see also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
14 512 U.S. 298 (1994); see discussion infra note 79 and accompanying text.
15 530 U.S. 363 (2000); see discussion infra note 83 and accompanying text.
16 See generally Spiro infra note 41; see also infra note 71 and accompanying text.
17 Donald C. Clarke, China's Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance, 2
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 97, 106 (2003).
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with U.S. obligations under GATT.' 8 This fundamental question remains
important and, to a large degree, unanswered.' 9 Moreover, it must now be
considered in light of new and more complex world trade disciplines,
changing notions of sovereignty and federalism, and new legal systems
which often defy predictability.
The GATT/WTO agreements contain multiple specific provisions
addressing the distribution of power in federal systems, 2all modeled after
the general "federal clause" in GATT Article XXIV:12, which requires
each Member to employ such "reasonable measures" as "may be available
to it" to ensure compliance by regional and local governments with GATT
obligations. 2  Article XXIV:12 contains unresolved ambiguities regarding
whether and to what extent federal nation/states are obligated to secure
compliance by regional and local governments with GATT/WTO
obligations.2 2  The United States has adopted conflicting positions in
separate GATT disputes regarding the interpretation and application of
Article XXIV: 1223 and no GATT Panel has conclusively interpreted the
ambiguous provisions. While the ambiguities may have served the
GATT/WTO well during its formative years, they now serve as potential
impediments to the system's growth.
This Article explores the ambiguities in the GATT/WTO regulation of
federal systems and the possible need for changes to ensure future regional
and local compliance with the new and diverse trade agenda being
negotiated in the WTO. Part II explores the history of the GATT/WTO
effort to create an international organization capable of balancing the
inherent tension between supranational regulation and nation/state
sovereignty. Part III reviews the distribution of power in federal
constitutional systems, particularly focusing on the United States, which
distributes power between national authorities and state governments. Part
IV examines the United States' implementation of its GATT/WTO
obligations. Part V reviews the history and development of GATT/WTO
regulation of federal systems, as embodied in GATT Article XXIV: 12 and
18 Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT, supra note 12, at 219.
19 As a technical matter, unless an opposite intention is evident, any international
agreement entered by the United States is binding on the states. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27.
20 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2.2,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO];
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, art.
13, WTO; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 3.1, 3.4 & 3.5,
WTO; General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 1.3(a), WTO.
21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XXIV: 12, [hereinafter
GATT].
22 See discussion infra note 145 and accompanying text.
23 See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
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GATT Panel decisions. Part VI concludes by summarizing the challenges
facing the current regulatory framework and exploring options for
improving compliance and regulation in this area.
II. HISTORY OF GATT/WTO INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND
EVOLVING NOTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
In order to adequately understand how the WTO regulates the
divergent political and economic systems of its Members, it is necessary
first to review the "precursor" to the WTO, the GATT. The WTO itself
pays homage to its GATT heritage by stipulating that "the WTO shall be
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by"
the GATT parties.24 During World War II, the United States and the United
Kingdom began taking steps to address the economic policy mistakes that
in large part lead to the outbreak of war. In 1944 a conference was held in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire during which it was decided that the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank would be chartered to
address monetary and banking issues.
2 6
After the renewal of the reciprocal trade agreements legislation in
1945, the United States and other nations began preparatory work to form
an international trade system. Out of this work emerged the GATT which
was not intended to have an organizational structure but only to represent a
multilateral treaty governing tariff reductions.28 A draft charter establishing
the International Trade Organization ("ITO") eventually emerged but was
never implemented, primarily because the United States Congress rejected
it as outside the scope of the negotiating mandate provided in the renewal of
the reciprocal trade agreements legislation.29 Thus, out of necessity and by
default, the GATT assumed an organizational structure in the void left by
the rejection of the ITO. 30  The GATT operated under a Protocol of
Provisional Application beginning on January 1, 1948 and evolved into a de
facto organization with a GATT council and other subordinate bodies. 31
The GATT was not an international organization with legal personality,
which in addition to numerous other "birth defects," limited its ability to
24 WTO, supra note 20, art. XVI: I. This carries over prior GATT jurisprudence in an
effort to lend security and confidence to the system.
25 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35-36 (2nd ed. 2000) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM].
26 id.
27 Id. at 36.
28 Id. at 38.
29 id.
30 JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 25, at 35-36.
31 Id. at 46.
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effectively regulate the conduct of the contracting parties.32  All of this
changed when an agreement was reached at a ministerial meeting in
Marrakesh, Morocco on April 14, 1994 establishing the WTO.
The WTO sprang from the large single undertaking negotiated during
the Uruguay Round. During the latter part of the negotiations, the parties
recognized the need for a supranational organization with sufficient
authority to regulate the massive new agreement. In order to remedy the
GATT "birth defects," an international organization was created with an
organizational structure, legal personality and separate legal status. 33 The
parties also reached agreement on a Dispute Settlement Understanding
which goes significantly further than the GATT by providing a right to a
dispute settlement panel, a reverse consensus procedure for adoption of
dispute settlement reports,34 and a right of appeal to an Appellate Body
sitting in groups of three out of a roster of seven individuals serving on a
part time basis. 35
The practical impact of the WTO's substantive provisions on the
regulation of world trade cannot be overstated. The WTO system adds
predictability to international trade, allowing members some measure of
security when engaging the international marketplace. On a more
fundamental level, however, the WTO represents an unprecedented transfer
of sovereignty from WTO Members to the international organization sitting
in Geneva, Switzerland. This fact resonated loudly in the halls of the
United States Congress during consideration of the Uruguay Round
36agreements. Some opponents characterized the WTO as a wholesale
surrender and unconstitutional usurpation of Congress' ability to regulate
foreign economic affairs,37 while others argued that the WTO represented
an elite international bureaucracy responding to the interests of
32 JACKSON et al., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra
note 12, at 211-216.
33 WTO, supra note 20, Art. VIII: 1; JACKSON et al., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 221.
34 The reverse consensus procedure provides that a report shall be adopted unless there is
a consensus not to adopt. This is markedly different from the GATT procedure that required
a consensus to adopt, which many believe was a major birth defect in the GATT system.
35 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 6.1, 16.4 & 17.1, WTO, supra note 20.
36 See generally John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States
Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
157 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate].
37 See, e.g., Patrick J. Buchanan, Fritz Hollings Derails the GAT Express, DENVER
POST, Oct. 2, 1994, at F4 ("In the World Trade Organization, established by GATT, America
surrenders her national sovereignty, her freedom of action to defend her own economic vital
interests from the job pillagers of Tokyo and Beijing. We give up our freedom - to foreign
bureaucrats who will assume authority over America's commerce that the Founding Fathers
gave exclusively to the Congress of the United States.").
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multinational corporations at the expense of the United States' sovereign
interests.38 Supporters counterbalanced the transfer of sovereignty inherent
in any international agreement with the immeasurable economic benefits
attainable in efficient global free trade.39 Proponents also suggested that
loss of sovereignty could be mitigated by implementing legislation and by
U.S. policy administration.4 °
While the sovereignty debate has not waned since the United States
implemented the Uruguay Round agreements, it has taken on a new
dimension. Scholars now question the continuing viability of the traditional
Westphalian notion of sovereignty in light of globalization and increasing
world interdependence. 41 A new concept of "sovereignty-modern" has been
proposed to address "the use or misuse of older sovereignty thinking.A
2
This theory holds that economic "globalization," such as the availability of
cheap labor, the technological advances providing new and versatile means
of global communication, and the increasing involvement of local and
regional authorities in international relations, has made traditional nation-
states increasingly interdependent and less able to effectively regulate
internal activity absent the development of institutional international control
mechanisms. In the context of world trade, this theory invokes a more
universal concept than the traditional parochial notion of sovereignty,
which fails to recognize the inability of individual nation-states to
effectively regulate in a globalized economy, and the consequent necessity
of international institutions to protect market function.43 Another new
approach attacks the increasingly anachronistic foundation of the traditional
38 The World Trade Organization: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 103rd Cong. 69 (1994) (testimony of William A. Lovett) ("What GATT 1994 is
about is institutionalizing a Brussels-like, European-style elitist bureaucracy, oriented
especially to the interests of multinational corporations, and not very sensitive to many of the
interests which are important in the United States.").
39 Results of the Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations: Hearings Before the S. Fin. Comm.,
103rd Cong. 114 (1994) (testimony of John H. Jackson); World Trade Organization: Hearing
Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103rd Cong. 857 (1994) (testimony of John H.
Jackson); Trade Agreements Resulting From The Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 10 3rd Cong. 814 (1994) (written submission of Terence P. Stewart).40 Written Submission of Terence P. Stewart, supra note 39; Testimony of John H.
Jackson Before S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, supra note 39; see also Matthew Schaefer,
Sovereignty, Influence, Realpolitik and the World Trade Organization, 25 HASTINGS INT'L &
Comp. L. REv. 341, 345 (2002).
41 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT'L L., 782, 786 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter Jackson, Sovereignty-
Modern]; Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 649, 668-69 (2002) [hereinafter Spiro, Globalization].
42 Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern, supra note 41, at 785.
41 Id. at 798-99.
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protectionist argument that nation-state sovereignty is threatened by the
expansion of international institutions." This "sovereignty-strengthening"
theory suggests that international institutions such as the WTO actually
strengthen nation-state sovereignty. The assumption is that "changes in the
international system or in domestic politics have already compromised
sovereignty in an irrevocable manner, and thus international institutions,
while rendering the erosion of sovereignty more legible, actually serve as a
means to reassert or reclaim sovereignty.A
5
As the debate continues and traditional notions of nation-state
sovereignty evolve, the impact of globalization and supranational regulation
of trade on the autonomy of subsidiary governments located within nation-
states must be reassessed. This subject has largely been ignored in the
current international sovereignty debate. One notable exception is the
expansion of the "disaggregated state" theory.46 In contrast to the
"upward" transfer of sovereign authority from nation-states to international
institutions, the "disaggregated state" theory focuses on the "downward"
transfer of power from the nation-state to regional and local governments.
As nation-states become more interconnected and interdependent,
centralized international relations dependent upon central government
control decline.47 This in turn leads to a dilution of central government
responsibility and a fundamental shift in the institutional structure of the
global system, forcing a re-examination of old constitutional and
international norms in light of the new circumstances.48 As the major
proponent of this theory describes it:
The institutionalization of interstate relations, the disaggregation of the
state, and economic globalization all suggest foundational shifts in the
structure of the global system. To the extent constitutional doctrines
have been grounded in the old framework, they must be reexamined
against the new. Frameworks conceived in other times may emerge
inappropriate in the changed global context.
49
As a consequence of these fundamental structural changes, this theory
44 Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 841 (December 2003).
41 id. at 843.
46 The original "disaggregated state" theory was developed by Professor Anne-Marie
Slaughter. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct.
1997 at 183.
47 Spiro, Globalization, supra note 41, at 668-69.
41 Id. at 674-75.
49 Id. at 673. Professor Spiro even suggests that the international rule of state
responsibility for the conduct of its constituent elements may need modification in light of
state disaggregation. Id. at 671.
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concludes that "states and other subfederal actors should no longer suffer
any constitutional bar from foreign policy-making activities."
50
The constitutional legitimacy of the assertion that state governments in
the United States should now have free reign to engage in foreign policy-
making is far from certain. 51 However, there is no question that the post-
cold war world has undergone a fundamental shift of traditional power
structures with lasting implications on the autonomy of regional and local
governments throughout the world. As technology and communication
costs decrease and the world becomes increasingly interdependent, the
ability of regional and local actors to engage and impact foreign affairs and
commerce increases exponentially. 52 Indeed, where most localities used to
have sporadic contact with foreign governments, they now have routine
contacts and well-established relationships.53 The emergence of regional
and local governments on the world scene, coupled with an aggressive trade
agenda encompassing politically sensitive areas to some degree under the
control of these local entities, increases the potential for disguised
restrictions on trade and other protectionist measures which could thwart
trade liberalization. As most of the negative fluctuations created by
international trade liberalization (i.e., loss of jobs) are borne at the local
level, the likelihood of trade restrictions emanating from the local level
increases. The current debate in the United States over international trade
policy is just one example of the appeal of local protectionism to regional
powers facing the negative effects of trade.50
50 Id. at 686. One proponent of the theory has even questioned the continuing viability of
the Charming Betsy canon of judicial construction, which requires a statutory construction of
domestic federal statutes that complies with international law obligations. Curtis A. Bradley,
The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of
International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 484-85 (1998). At least one recent federal appellate
court decision has marginally called the Charming Betsy canon into question. See Timken
Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (upholding Department of
Commerce zeroing practice in anti-dumping investigations despite WTO decision finding
similar practice by European Community as a violation of GATT/WTO rules).
51 See generally infra Section III.
52 See Emily Chiang, Think Locally, Act Globally? Dormant Federal Common Law
Preemption of State and Local Activities Affecting Foreign Affairs, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv.
923, 924-25 (2003); Spiro, Globalization, supra note 41, at 667-71.
53 Spiro, Globalization, supra note 41, at 669. From 1982 to 1994, state governments in
the United States almost tripled their number of overseas offices. In 1990, eight Canadian
provinces maintained overseas offices, spending more on international trade activities than
the state governments of the United States. See Earl H. Fry, Sovereignty and Federalism:
US. and Canadian Perspectives Challenges to Sovereignty and Governance, 20 CAN.-U.S.
L.J. 303, 309-10 (1994).
54 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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III. DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER IN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS
In order to appreciate how the GATT/WTO system regulates federal
nation-states, we must first examine how federal nation-states
constitutionally distribute foreign affairs power.55 This Article focuses on
the distribution of foreign affairs power in the United States. However,
there are other WTO Members with political and economic systems that
pose similar, and in some respects more difficult, compliance problems.
Canada, for instance, has a somewhat weak federal tradition with significant
authority over international trade issues reserved to the provinces.5 6 The
European Union is another example, which some view as an evolving
federal state as opposed to an international organization.57 China's recent
accession to the WTO poses its own unique challenges58 and Russia's
future accession will raise similar concerns.
It goes without saying that the United States federal government holds
a preeminent position over states with respect to foreign affairs. The
President of the United States has considerable latitude and authority over
non-economic foreign affairs issues. This authority emanates from Article
II Constitutional delegations appointing the President Commander in Chief,
granting the President the treaty power (with the advice and consent of the
Senate) and charging the President with the appointment of ambassadors. 59
Most Presidential power over foreign commerce must be delegated from
Congress, which under the Commerce Clause has authority to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes., 60 The Supremacy Clause accords supremacy to federal laws
enacted pursuant to the commerce power.6' Article III extends the federal
judicial power to cases involving federal enactments and other transnational
controversies.62 The states are constitutionally prohibited from executing
treaties, entering into agreements with other countries, or imposing duties
on imports or exports.63  Federal authority is limited by the Tenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that "[t]he
55 The phrase "foreign affairs" is used throughout this article in a broad sense to include
any activities implicating international affairs, including foreign policy and commerce.
56 JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 25, at 89; James P. Mcilroy,
NAFTA and the Canadian Provinces: Two Ships Passing in the Night?, 23 CAN-U.S. L.J.
431,438 (1997).
57 JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 25, at 100.
58 See supra note 17.
59 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cls. 1,2.60 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
61 Id. at art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
62 Id. at art. III.
13 Id. at art. !, § 10, cls. 1-3.
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powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited bY it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.'
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the Commerce
Clause "limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate
trade."65  The Court expanded the domestic commerce power into a
dormant foreign affairs power excluding the states from activity implicating
foreign affairs, even in the absence of contrary federal action. The two
most notable decisions establishing federal exclusivity over foreign affairs
are Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles67 and Zschernig v. Miller.68
Japan Line reinforced the prohibition against state regulations implicating
foreign commerce by invalidating a California ad valorem property tax
imposed on foreign-owned cargo containers involved in international
commerce. 69  Zschernig broadly condemned state activity having "more
than some incidental or indirect effect" on foreign relations by striking
down a state probate measure discriminating against residents of Eastern
bloc nations.70
Even though Japan Line and Zschernig remain valid precedent, there
is substantial evidence that the Supreme Court is softening the default rule
against state involvement in foreign affairs.71 The trend began with the
arrival of Associate Justice William Rehnquist and the Court's subsequent
domestic federalism decisions.72 The foundation for this shift was laid in
Gregory v. Ashcroft,73 where Justice O'Connor elucidated themes that
would predominate later pro-states opinions. "As every schoolchild learns,
64 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
65 Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
66 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233-34 (1942) (executive agreement
trumps state law); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (treaty power extends to
issues with international concern).
67 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
68 Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
69 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 448-49 (state law can violate the dormant foreign commerce
clause by impeding federal government's ability to speak with "one voice" in foreign
affairs).
70 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434.
71 Spiro, Globalization, supra note 41, at 695; Goldsmith, infra note 82; James J. Pascoe,
Time for a New Approach? Federalism and Foreign Affairs After Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 291, 305 (Jan, 2002).
72 See Chiang, supra note 52 at 951 ("More generally, the legacy of the Rehnquist Court
in particular may be the Court's reevaluation of long-standing principles of federalism and
the proper balance of power between the state and federal governments, resulting in a
distinct and definite shift in authority from the latter to the former.").
73 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (Missouri statute imposing mandatory
judicial retirement age upheld despite contrary provision in federal Age Discrimination in
Employment Act).
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our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States
and the Federal Government" which affords states "substantial sovereign
authority. 74  Similarly, in New York v. United States, Justice O'Connor
reiterated that:
[t]he Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal
Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve
power to the States. The Tenth Amendment thus directs us to
determine, as in this case, whether an incident of state sovereignty is
protected by a limitation on an Article I power.
75
Justice O'Connor went on to stress that:
[w]hile Congress has substantial powers to govern the nation directly,
including areas of intimate concern to the States, the Constitution has
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress' instructions.
76
These pro-states themes culminated in the landmark United States v.
Lopez decision in which the Court, for the first time since 1937, struck
down a federal statute enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause."
The aforementioned domestic federalism decisions undoubtedly
influenced the Court's recent decisions softening the federal dormant
foreign affairs power doctrine.78 The first such decision arrived in 1994
when the Court in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board79 upheld the
constitutionality of a California corporate tax scheme that taxed
multinational corporations doing business in California by reviewing their
worldwide income and taxing that portion attributable to California
operations. This "worldwide combined reporting" scheme generated
enormous dissent from foreign countries and conflicted with the federal
government's "separate accounting" system which treats each corporate
14 Id. at 457.
75 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (federal Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 unconstitutional intrusion on state prerogatives).
76 Id. at 162.
77 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).(Gun Free School Zones Act, which
made it a federal offense to possess a firearm in a school zone, struck down because
"possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense economic activity that might,
through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce."). For
additional states' rights or federalism cases, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997);
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
78 See Spiro, Globalization, supra note 41, at 695.
79 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1994).
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entity separately for tax purposes.80 Some view the Barclays Bank decision
as an unprecedented assault on the Japan Line "one voice" tradition
because the state measure had significantly more than a "potential" to
interfere with foreign relations. 81 Others have even suggested that Barclays
"marks the end of all dormant foreign affairs preemption doctrines. 82
The next major Supreme Court decision involving international
federalism is perhaps best known not for its affirmative ruling but for the
issues it avoided. The Court's 2000 decision in Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council8 3 sparked wide debate regarding state regulations impacting
foreign affairs and the continuing viability of the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine espoused in Japan Line and Zschernig.84 In Crosby, the Court was
asked to evaluate the constitutionality of a 1996 Massachusetts procurement
law restricting state purchases of goods and services from companies doing
business with the Union of Myanmar ("Burma"). Massachusetts
promulgated the law in order to express its condemnation of Burmese
human rights violations by using its economic authority to encourage
companies to stop doing business in Burma. The federal government
passed a similar law three months later, which served as the basis for the
Supreme Court's decision invalidating the Massachusetts law on
preemption grounds.85  Before the ultimate preemption decision by the
Supreme Court, the Massachusetts law met with considerably broader
constitutional disapproval in the lower courts.
The National Foreign Trade Council filed suit in 1998 alleging that the
Massachusetts law was infirm on three grounds: the federal foreign affairs
power, the Foreign Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause. In
November 1998, the U.S. District Court for Massachusetts struck down the
Burma law as an impermissible infringement on the federal foreign affairs
power, noting federal plenary power over foreign affairs and the Supreme
80 Id. at 303-06.
81 See Spiro, Globalization, supra note 41, at 695.
82 Jack L. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 175, 212
(2001); see generally Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Federalism, and Foreign Affairs,
83 VA. L. REv. 1617 (1997); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign
Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
341 (1999). Contra Chiang, supra note 52, at 954-55.
83 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
84 The state regulation at issue in Crosby also sparked a complaint by the European
Community and Japan under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. See WTO, Panel
Established in Government Procurement Dispute ("The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), on
21 October, established a panel to examine complaints by the European Communities and
Japan that a Massachusetts law had violated provisions of the plurilateral Agreement on
Government Procurement") (Oct. 29, 1998) available at http://www.wto.org/english/
newse/news98_e/wdsboct.htm
85 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 364.
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Court's recognition of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs. 86  The First
Circuit affirmed the district court's invalidation of the law on three
independent grounds. 87 First, the appellate court agreed with the district
court and affirmed the law's invalidity as an unconstitutional interference
with the federal foreign affairs power based on the Supreme Court's
Zschernig decision.88 Second, the First Circuit found the Massachusetts law
invalid under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 89 Finally, the First Circuit
found the state law preempted by its federal counterpart.9°
In a significantly shorter and substantively narrower opinion, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the invalidity of the Massachusetts
law solely on the basis of preemption.9 The Supreme Court abstained from
examining the full array of constitutional issues presented by the
Massachusetts law and addressed by the First Circuit.92 The Court's failure
to address the substantive issues of foreign affairs and foreign commerce
has spurred much academic debate and speculation regarding the continuing
viability of the Japan Line and Zschernig cases. Some believe that
Crosby's narrow holding is an affirmation of the Court's continuing trend
towardgreater states' rights and leaves the door open for a reversal of the
86 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 290-91 (D. Mass. 1998)
(citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 3 (common defense), art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty power), art
I, § 10, cls. 1-3 (state prohibitions), Zschernig, 349 U.S. at 434-35 & 441 (state laws with
indirect or incidental effect in foreign countries and potential for disruption are
unconstitutional); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (exclusive federal power
over external affairs)).
87 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
88 Id. at 45. The Court found that the law had more than an "incidental or indirect effect"
in foreign countries. Id. at 52 (quoting Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434).
89 Id. at 45. The Court ruled that Massachusetts was not acting as a market participant but
rather as a market regulator in that its law imposed sanctions related to activities that have no
connection to Massachusetts. Id. at 63. The Court further conveyed its skepticism as to
whether the Foreign Commerce Clause even has a market participant exception. Id. at 65-66.
90 Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45.
91 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373.
92 Id. at 374 (Court declined "to speak to field preemption as a separate issue... or to
pass on the First Circuit's rulings addressing the foreign affairs power or the dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause."). Some of the amicus curiae briefs in support of the
Massachusetts law highlighted the Court's recent states' rights decisions in Lopez, New York
and Barclays Bank as justification for upholding the statute. See generally Brief for Amici
Curiae States, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 1999 WL 33611395; Brief for
Amicus Curiae Coalition for Local Sovereignty, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council,
2000 WL 27690.
93 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the "One-Voice" Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations,
46 VILL. L. REV. 975 (2001); Daniel Halberstam, The Foreign Relations of Federal Systems:
A National Perspective on the Benefits of State Participation, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1015 (2001);
Goldsmith, supra note 82.
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dormant foreign affairs doctrine in an appropriate case.94
The Supreme Court recently issued another decision implicating the
relationship between the federal foreign affairs power and the ability of
states to participate in activities implicating foreign relations. In a
splintered 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court invalidated the California
Holocaust Victim Relief Act which required insurers doing business in
California to disclose information regarding insurance policies sold in
Europe between 1920 and 1945. 95  The Court ruled that the California
statute impermissibly interfered with the President's ability to conduct
foreign affairs in light of various executive agreements entered by the
President to resolve unpaid insurance claims owed to Nazi victims. 96 Thus,
the Court found that the California statute conflicted with federal law and
invalidated it under an implied preemption theory as an impermissible
encroachment on the President's inherent foreign affairs power.97 The
dissenting opinion departed from the majority by finding that, in the
absence of an express intention in the federal law to preempt state action,
the state law which merely required disclosure of certain information, does
not compromise "the President's ability to speak with one voice for the
Nation.
The impact of Garamendi on the ongoing debate over federal/state
distribution of powers over foreign affairs is limited. The Court struck
down the law in light of the wide latitude afforded the Executive in foreign
affairs, but it does not resolve the "dormant foreign commerce" issue
originating in Zschernig and addressed in Barclays Bank.99 In fact, the
Court specifically distinguished Barclays Bank on the ground that it
involved foreign commerce power and not foreign policy, in which the
President retains the lead role.' 00 This distinction needs Court clarification,
because globalization has caused virtually everything, including economic
94 See Spiro, Globalization supra note 41, at 696 ("In short, Crosby may well emerge as a
transitional case on the way to a more permissive doctrinal regime for state foreign policy-
making, as evidenced by other developments."); Pascoe, supra note 71 (adopting revisionist
view of federal foreign affairs in which states assume status of demi-sovereigns under
international law); Peter Spiro, Cities, States, and Foreign Affairs: The Massachusetts
Burma Case and Beyond, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 146 (2003). Contra David M. Golove,
The Implications of Crosby for Federal Exclusivity in Foreign Affairs, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 152 (2003) ("Crosby suggests that dormant foreign affairs preemption is still a vital, if
limited, doctrine.").
95 Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 2379 (2003).
96 Id. at 2381-82.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 2401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
99 See Brannon P. Denning, International Decisions, 97 AM. J. INT'L' L. 950, 958
(2003).
100 Garamendi, 123 S.Ct. at 2321 n.12.
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matters, to at least marginally implicate foreign affairs.' 0
At the end of the day, the current constitutional role of the states in
foreign affairs remains unclear. On one hand, the traditional orthodox view
adopts an "exclusivity principle," under which the federal government
enjoys exclusive authority over foreign affairs. 0 2 On the other hand, a
revisionist view is challenging the foundation of the orthodox view in light
of globalization and changing notions of sovereignty.'0 3 To the extent the
Supreme Court's recent cases highlight a fundamental shift towards greater
state participation in foreign affairs, the potential implications for the world
trading system are significant.
For example, if Massachusetts' law regarding Burma in Crosby had
been sustained as a valid exercise of state constitutional authority, the
United States would have had to defend the measure in the dispute
settlement proceeding initiated by the European Community and Japan. No
doubt the United States would have invoked Article XXIV: 12 as an
exception because no "reasonable measures" would have been
constitutionally "available to it" to ensure Massachusetts' compliance with
GATT/WTO obligations. Could the United States properly invoke Article
XXIV: 12 as an exemption to providing compensation to other WTO
Members negatively impacted by the Massachusetts law? As will be
discussed in Part V infra, even though the Understanding on Article XXIV
reaffirms nation/state responsibility for acts or omissions of its component
government units, neither the Understanding nor any of the relevant Panel
decisions answer the question of what a Member must do when the subject
matter of the measure at issue falls within the constitutional prerogative of a
subfederal unit. This predicament may become more prevalent as the WTO
completes negotiations on existing topics and adds new disciplines reaching
into areas regulated (or potentially regulated) by regional and local
governments and as the distribution of power in federal states evolves
toward greater local participation.
IV. U.S. IMPLEMENTATION OF GATT/WTO OBLIGATIONS
As noted in Part I, supporters of the Uruguay Round agreements
countered loss of sovereignty arguments by emphasizing the United States'
ability to mitigate such loss in its implementing legislation.' °4 The GATT
was never actually implemented by Congress and applied provisionally
101 See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIvE TREE,
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (Anchor Books 2000) (1999).
102 See Pascoe, supra note 71, at 303-06.
103 Id. at 306-07.
104 See Written Submission of Terence P. Stewart, supra note 39; Testimony of John H.
Jackson Before Foreign Relations Comm., supra note 39; Schaefer, supra note 40.
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under the Protocol of Provisional Application for 50 years. 1°5 Unlike the
GATT, the Uruguay Round agreements establishing the WTO were
submitted to Congress pursuant to the fast track procedure for approval of
Congressional-Executive agreements. 0 6  Congressional-Executive and
other international agreements enter United States law in one of two
ways. 10 7 First, the agreement's terms may indicate that it is self-executing,
in which case it enters United States law directly. 10 8  Second, if the
agreement's terms do not indicate that it is self-executing (including
explicit calls for implementing legislation), then it enters United States law
only after enactment of separate Congressional implementation legislation
or an executive proclamation pursuant to prior Congressional
authorization. 10 9 Once the international agreement is thus implemented, it
becomes directly applicable federal law and attains equal rank with other
federal law." 0
Importantly, the implementing legislation does not always mirror the
language of the international agreement, leaving open the possibility that
subsequent regulatory actions could comply with domestic law (the
implementing legislation), but conflict with the international agreement. In
that situation, the United States could be in violation of the rule of
customary international law disallowing treaty parties to invoke domestic
law as a basis for violation of an-international obligation."'
The Uruguay Round agreements were not self-executing and therefore
required Congressional implementation in order to enter U.S. law." 2 The
agreements were signed on April 15, 1994 and Congress subsequently
worked with the Office of the United States Trade Representative to
develop implementing legislation. 113 The question of state compliance was
heavily debated in the ensuing discussions. A major concern of the states
was the potential for the wide-ranging agreements to invalidate state laws in
areas "such as economic regulation, environmental affairs, product safety
and health standards, etc. (insofar as these were left to the states by
Congress or other federal bodies)." 115 In fact, an association of state
105 Jackson, supra note 36, at 163.
106 Id. at 168.
107 Hudec, The Legal Status of the GA 77, supra note 12, at 188-91.
108 id.
10 Id
"10 Id. at 190.
"' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27.
112 Jackson, supra note 36, at 168.
... Id. at 169.
114 Id. at 185.
115 Id.
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Attorneys General submitted "sub-federal sovereignty objections" to the
agreements." 1
6
On September 27, 1994 the President submitted a Statement of
Administrative Action ("SAA") to Congress accompanying the
implementing bill for the Uruguay Round agreements.I Congress
approved the implementing bill and the SAA, which constitutes "an
authoritative expression" by the United States concerning the interpretation
and application of the Uruguay Round agreements, both for purposes of
U.S. international obligations and domestic law." 8 Section 102(b) of the
implementing legislation governs the relationship of the Uruguay Round
agreements and state law.11
9
The SAA extensively discusses section 102(b) and the relationship
between the agreements and state law and highlights the various substantive
and procedural protections afforded to the states in implementing the
legislation, all of which sigificantly alter the relationship between the
agreements and state law.12  At the outset, the SAA declares that "the
Uruguay Round agreements do not automatically 'preempt' or invalidate
state laws that do not conform to the rules set out in those agreements -
even if a dispute settlement panel were to find a state measure inconsistent
with such an agreement.' 2' Section 102(c) of the implementing legislation
precludes private rights of action against state governments on the basis of a
provision of the agreements; only the federal government may commence
such an action. 12 In such a challenge, the United States may not introduce
any WTO panel or Appellate Body report as evidence of non-conformity
and must restrict its argument(s) to the treaty text. 23 As of today, no such
action has been initiated to invalidate a state law. 1
24
Section 102(b) establishes a procedure for federal/state consultations
116 Id.
117 Statement of Administrative Action for the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, tit. I,
§ 101, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, 103rd Cong. (2d Sess. 1994) [hereinafter SAA].
118 19 U.S.C. 3511 § 101(a).
'19 id. at § 102(b).
120 SAA, supra note 117, at 670-77, 696 (general discussion); SAA, supra note 117, at
754-55 (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement); SAA, supra note 117, at 779, 782-83
(Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement); SAA, supra note 117, at 297 (General Agreement
on Trade in Services).
121 Id. at 670. As discussed in Section V infra, this language further complicates Article
XXIV: 12.
122 Id. at 676.
123 19 U.S.C. 3501.
124 The Court of International Trade has proposed to assume concurrent jurisdiction with
United States District Courts over claims brought pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2). See
The Customs and International Trade Courts Improvement Act of 2003, proposed 28 U.S.C.
§ 1582(c) (copy available from author upon request).
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to secure U.S. compliance with its international obligations "through the
greatest possible degree of state-federal consultation and cooperation...,125
As will be discussed in greater detail in Part VI, infra, the SAA calls for
consultations with an intergovernmental policy advisory committee along
with a "WTO Coordinator for State Matters" in the Office of the United
States Trade Representative. 26
V. GATT/WTO REGULATION OF FEDERAL NATION/STATES
As a general rule, customary international law imposes responsibility
on federal nation/states for acts or omissions of their component
governmental units, that violate international obligations of the
nation/states.1 27 This obligation exists even where the internal law of the
federal nation/state does not provide authority to compel compliance by the
component governmental units.128  This customary international law
obligation applies as the default rule unless a contrary intention is
evidenced in the text of the international treaty. 129 Thus, the first question
to ask when examining international regulation of federal nation/states is
whether the treaty language evidences an intention to "opt out" of the
default rule of nation/state responsibility for subfederal governmental units.
While there was some early doubt with respect to the intentions of the
contracting parties in GATT, there is now no question that federal
GATT/WTO Members remain fully responsible for the actions of their
component governmental units. 30
There is no customary international law rule regarding what
measure(s), if any, central governments must take to seek compliance at the
local level. The GATT and ITO negotiators foresaw the potential problem
federal constitutional systems could pose to an international trading system.
In short, the issue is whether the central governments in federal
nation/states can ensure regional and local observance of GATT
obligations, and if not, how the international system should induce the
central governments to seek compliance. The principal GATT provision
addressing this issue is Article XXIV: 12, which provides that "[e]ach
contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available
to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the
regional and local governments and authorities within its territories."'
3
125 Id. at 670.
126 Id. at 671.
127 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 (1969).
128 Id
129 Id. at art. 29.
130 See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
13 GATT, art. XXIV, para. 12.
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A. Preparatory History of GATT Article XXIV: 12
The language of Article XXIV: 12 directly descends from language in
the draft ITO Charter.' 32  During the 1946 GATT and ITO preparatory
session, negotiators offered various justifications for inclusion of the
"federal clause" now represented by Article XXIV: 12, all of which
illustrate the struggle to integrate federal systems into the international trade
superstructure. Australia expressed its concern in the context of the draft
rule preventing discrimination in internal tax and regulatory provisions.
Australia anticipates considerable difficulty in giving full effect to the
operation of this section. Differences in treatment of domestic and
imported goods (and in some cases between British and "Foreign"
imported goods) occur in both Commonwealth and State practice.
Where such differences occur in Commonwealth laws, e.g. Excise and
Sales Tax, steps could over a period be taken to remove differentiation.
Where the matter is one solely of action by a State, and our "external
powers" laws do not give the Commonwealth authority to act, we would
agree to use our best efforts to secure modification or elimination of any
practice regarded as discriminatory.1
33
A United States negotiator echoed a similar concern regarding the draft
rule on government procurement practices.
The obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment in awarding
contracts applied to both central and local governments where the
central government was traditionally or constitutionally able to control
the local government. Although he could not speak decisively, he
thought that the United States Government would be able to control
actions of states in this matter. 1
34
A technical subcommittee reporting on the draft national treatment
article reported the concern among several countries regarding application
of the non-discrimination principle.
However, some countries called attention to practices which might be
contrary to this principle and suggested reservation for further
discussion bilaterally or ample time for their elimination. Several
countries emphasized that central governments could not in many cases
control subsidiary governments in this regard, but agreed that all should
132 John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 250, 304 n. 290 and sources cited therein [hereinafter
Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade].
133 U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.115, at 1 (1946).
131 U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.II/27, at 1 (1946).
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take such measures as might be open to them to ensure the objective.' 35
In response to these concerns, the technical subcommittee submitted
the addition of a clause to the national treatment article requiring
contracting parties to take "all measures" open to them to ensure that taxes
and other regulations by subsidiary governments within their territories did
not impair the objectives of the national treatment article.136 The language
of this "federal clause" was later changed to require each government to
"take such reasonable measures as may be available to it" to ensure
observance by subsidiary governments 13 and the entire "federal clause"
was moved to a general miscellaneous article to reflect the fact that the
problem of federal/state distribution of power applied to other substantive
provisions of the GATT as well. 138 This version of the "federal clause"
made its way into the draft GATT and, with some changes, the ITO
Charter. 39  This is the version currently contained in GATT Article
XXIV:12.
Various contracting parties sought to strengthen the "federal clause" to
require central governments to ensure compliance by regional and local
governments. The United States responded to a Chinese proposal to alter
the "reasonable measures" language by noting that "it is necessary to
distinguish between central or federal governments, which undertake these
obligations in a firm way, and local authorities, which are not strictly
bound, so to speak, by the provisions of the Agreement, depending of
course upon the constitutional procedure of the country concerned.' ' 140 The
federal clause withstood a proposed amendment by Mexico during the
Havana Conference which would have significantly altered the clause by
imposing full responsibility upon federal states for the non-conforming
actions of regional and local governments and by requiring the federal
states to take "all necessary measures" to bring the measure into
135 U.N. Doc. EPCT/C.11/54, at 4 (1946).
136 Id. at 6.
137 An explanatory note was added with respect to GATT art 111:1 in order to deal with
existing legislation. The explanatory note specifies that while internal taxes imposed by
local governments and authorities are subject to art XXIV:12, the term "reasonable
measures" would not require "the repeal of existing national legislation authorizing local
governments to impose internal taxes ... if such repeal would result in serious financial
hardship..." Moreover, the term "reasonable measures" would allow a contracting party to
"eliminate the inconsistent taxation gradually over a transition period, if abrupt action would
create serious administrative and financial difficulties." GATT art. III.
138 Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 132, at 306.
139 ld.
140 Amelia Porges, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE To GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 830, (6th
ed. 1995) (citing EPCT/TAC/PV/19, at 33) [hereinafter GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX].
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compliance. 14' The amendment would have changed the language to read:
Each Member shall take all necessary measures to assure observance of
the provisions of this Charter by the regional and local governments and
authorities within its territory and shall be responsible for any act or
omission to act contrary to the provisions of this Charter on the part of
any such government or authorities. 1
42
This proposed amendment goes much further than the current
provision by requiring "all necessary measures" to ensure observance. 43
Mexico eventually withdrew the proposal in light of constitutional
difficulties expressed by certain delegates in enforcing the provisions of the
amendment.'a
Throughout the application of the GATT under the Protocol of
Provisional Application, scholars recognized that Article XXIV:12
contained an inherent ambiguity subjecting it to two different
interpretations. 45 On the one hand, Article XXIV:12 could be interpreted
to recognize that in federal systems certain matters are within the legal
power of subfederal governments and beyond the control of the central arm
of government. 46  In those situations, the central government does not
violate its GATT treaty obligation when the subfederal government enacts
GATT-inconsistent measures as long as the central government does
everything within its power to ensure local compliance.
47
A second interpretation of Article XXIV:12 indicates that GATT was
not intended to apply to subfederal governments at all and even where the
central government has the authority to require local compliance, it is under
no obligation to do so, but merely to take "reasonable measures."'148 If the
second interpretation is correct, then GATT cannot be invoked as a matter
of law in proceedings involving conflicting state laws. 149 Several U.S. state
courts addressed this issue and essentially adopted the first interpretation by
141 Id. (citing E/CONF.2/C.6/48/Rev.1, at 4).
142 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (Havana, November 1947 to
March 1948), Committee VI, Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 (1948).
143 See infra note 215.
144 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (Havana, November 1947 to
March 1948), 6th Comm., U.N. Doc. E/CONF.2/C.6/12 (1948).
145 See Hudec, The Legal Status of GAT, supra note 12, at 219-221; Jackson et al.,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note 12, § 6.7(B), at 242-
244.
146 Jackson et al., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, supra note
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ruling that GATT, as part of federal law, prevails over conflicting state
law. 1
°
While the referenced U.S. state court cases support the first
interpretation, various United States officials assumed the opposite position
over the years by failing to acknowledge GATT's preemption of state law.
During a 1949 hearing before the United States Senate Finance Committee,
a U.S. State Department official took the position that Article XXIV:12
only obligates the federal government to persuade states to voluntarily
comply with GATT.151 This position was later adopted in a State
Department letter to the Hawaii Territorial Supreme Court in Hawaii v.
Ho,152 wherein the State Department Legal Advisor noted that the
obligation to take "reasonable measures" to obtain observance by local
authorities with respect to local GATT-inconsistent laws indicates that "as a
matter of law the General Agreement did not override such laws."' 153 The
position was again affirmed during implementation of the 1979 Tokyo
Round Standards Code when both Congress and the Executive branches
related that "reasonable measures" in the Standards Code required the
federal government only to make "polite requests for voluntary compliance
by state governments."'
54
The Uruguay Round negotiators attempted to address the inherent
ambiguities in Article XXIV: 12 by adopting an Understanding on the
Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade 1994. With respect to Article XXIV: 12, the Understanding provides
that "[e]ach Member is fully responsible under the GATT for the
observance of all provisions of the GATT 1994, and shall take such
reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure such observance by
regional and local governments and authorities within its territory."' 155 The
Understanding also makes clear that the provisions of the Dispute
150 See Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957) (Hawaii territorial law requiring signage
indicating sale of foreign eggs conflicted with GATT national treatment obligation); K.S.B.
Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Commission, 381 A.2d 774 (N.J.
1977) (recognition of GATT as superior to conflicting state law but finding no conflict
between local measure and GATT obligations). For a general discussion of these and other
cases see Hudec, supra note 12, at 221-225.
151 Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 132, at 303-304
(quoting testimony from Hearings on H.R. 1211 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
Extension of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 81st Cong 1161-62 (1949)).
152 See supra note 150.
153 Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 132, at 303
(quoting Letter from Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to Mr.
Sharpless, Acting Attorney General of Hawaii (February 26, 1957)).
154 Hudec, supra note 12, at 220.
155 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, XXIV: 12, 13.
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Settlement Understanding "may be invoked in respect of measures affecting
its observance by regional or local governments or authorities within the
territory of a Member."' 5 6 While the Understanding on Article XXIV:12
clarifies the responsibility of all GATT/WTO federal nation/states for the
non-conforming behavior of their component units under the GATT/WTO,
it leaves open the question of what constitutes "reasonable measures" to
seek compliance. This is a particularly important question to consider in
areas that fall within exclusive regional or local authority. Thus, despite the
Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV: 12, the extent of federal
nation/state obligations under Article XXIV: 12 remains unclear and what
constitutes "reasonable measures" to ensure local observance remains
ambiguous.1
5 7
B. GATT Panel Interpretations of Article XXIV: 12
Article XXIV: 12 was first applied and interpreted by a GATT dispute
settlement panel in Canada-Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins.'58
Although the Panel report has not been adopted, it provides an early, yet
extensive, analysis of Article XXIV: 12. South Africa claimed that a 1983
retail sales tax enacted by the Province of Ontario, Canada on gold coins
violated Articles II and III of the GATT and that Canada failed to carry out
its obligations under Article XXIV:12. 59 The provincial sales tax at issue
exempted Canadian Maple Leaf gold coins from a 7% sales tax levied on all
gold coins, whether produced in Canada or abroad. 160 Canada previously
included gold coins in a duty-free tariff concession as part of the Tokyo
Round agreements and South Africa claimed nullification and impairment
of the benefits of the Tokyo Round concession.1 61 Taxation authority for
revenue raising remained a provincial prerogative but responsibility for the
regulation of trade and commerce in currency and coinage was within the
exclusive authority of the Canadian Federal Parliament. 62  Inferior
Canadian courts were split on the issue of which level of government had
coinage taxation authority, with cases holding both in favor of provincial
authority and federal preemption.
163
The dispute settlement panel first determined that the Ontario sales tax
measure violated GATT Article 111:2 by subjecting the products of South
"'6 Id. at 14.
'5 See Cooper, supra note 12, at 157.
158 Canada-Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, Sept. 17, 1985, L/5863
[Hereinafter Canada-Gold Coins]
159 Id. at 2.
160 Id. at 5.
161 Id. at 6.
162 Id. at 8.
163 Id.
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Africa to an internal tax in excess of those applied to like domestic
products.' 64 The Panel then examined how Article XXIV:12 impacted
Canada's obligations under Article 111:2.165 Noting the principle of State
responsibility for the actions of its subsidiary organs embodied in Article 27
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Panel found the basic
purpose of Article XXIV: 12 "was to qualify the basic obligation to ensure
the observance of the General Agreement by regional and local government
,,166authorities in the case of contracting parties with a federal structure....
The basic question was "whether Article XXIV: 12 applies (a) all measures
taken at the regional or local level or (b) only to those measures which the
federal government cannot control because they fall outside its jurisdiction
under the constitutional distribution of competence."
' 67
After reviewing the legislative history of Article XXIV:12, the Panel
concluded "that Article XXIV: 12 applies only to those measures taken at
the regional or local level which the federal government cannot control
because they fall outside its jurisdiction under the constitutional distribution
of competence., 168 The Panel was unable to determine, based on the lack of
Canadian jurisprudence, whether the measure at issue fell within the
exclusive control of the federal government. 169 Accordingly, the Panel
"concluded that Canada had to be given the benefit of the doubt" and
applied Article XXIV: 12 to the Ontario measure.
170
Two alternative interpretations of Article XXIV: 12 were considered
with respect to the subject measure. 17' It could be interpreted either as (a)
limiting the application of the other GATT provisions or (b) as limiting
only the obligation of federal states to secure local implementation of the
GATT.1 2 Article XXIV: 12 is an exception to Vienna Convention Article
27 insofar as "it grants a special right to federal States without giving an
offsetting privilege to unitary States" and therefore it could "lead to
imbalances in rights and obligations between unitary and federal States"
where the latter meets constitutional difficulties in carrying out its GATT
obligations. 173 With this potential imbalance in mind,
the Panel considered that, as an exception to a general principle of law
164 Canada-Gold Coins, supra note 158, at 14, 52.
165 id.
166 id.
167 Id. (emphasis in original).
168 Id. at 15.
169 Id.
170 Canada-Gold Coins, supra note 158, at 15-16.
171 Id. at 16.
172 Id.
171 Id. at 17.
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favouring certain contracting parties, Article XXIV:12 should be
interpreted in a way that meets the constitutional difficulties which
federal States may have in ensuring the observance of the provisions of
the General Agreement by local governments, while minimizing the
danger that such difficulties lead to imbalances in the rights and
obligations of contracting parties. Only an interpretation according to
which Article XXIV: 12 does not limit the applicability of the provisions
of the General Agreement but merely limits the obligations of federal
States to secure their implementation would achieve this aim. 174
Finally, the Panel considered whether Canada fulfilled its obligation to
take "such reasonable measures as may be available to it" to ensure
Ontario's observance of Article 111:2.175 With respect to what constitutes
"reasonable measures" South Africa argued that Canada could have referred
the matter to the Supreme Court and its failure to do so violated Article
XXIV: 12.76 Canada asserted that Article XXIV: 12 reserved to each
contracting party the right to determine on its own whether a measure was
reasonable. 1 7 The Panel rejected Canada's position and ruled
that in determining which measures to secure the observance of the
provisions of the General Agreement are 'reasonable' within the
meaning of Article XXIV: 12, the consequences of their non-observance
by the local government for trade relations with other contracting parties
are to be weighed against the domestic difficulties of securing
observance.17
8
The Panel weighed the negative trade implications of the Ontario
measure against the domestic difficulty in securing observance of Article
111:2 by Ontario and ruled that it could not determine whether referring the
issue to the Canadian Supreme Court constitutes a reasonable measure. 179
In closing, the Panel recommended that Canada compensate South Africa
for lost competitive opportunities and continue to take "such reasonable
measures as are available" to secure observance by Ontario. 1
80
The second GATT panel to consider Article XXIV: 12 involved a
claim by the United States that certain practices of Canadian provincial
liquor boards violated GATT Article 111.18 In Canada-Import, Distribution
174 Id. (emphasis in original).
175 Id.
176 Canada-Gold Coins, supra note 158, at 17.
177 id.
178 Id. at 18.
179 Id.
18o Id.
181 Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks By Provincial
Marketing Agencies, DS17/R-39S/27 (October 16, 1991) [hereinafter Canada-Import],
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and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks By Provincial Marketing Agencies,
the Panel considered practices of provincial liquor boards that enjoy
monopoly power over the supply and distribution of alcoholic beverages
within their provincial borders. 82 The United States' complaint focused on
the higher price mark-ups applied to imported beer compared with domestic
beer and the allowance for private delivery and direct sales systems for
domestic brewers, while imported brewers were forced to distribute through
the provincial liquor boards. 83 The Panel concluded that these practices
violated GATT Article 111:4.184
With respect to Article XXIV: 12, the United States argued that Canada
had not employed "reasonable measures" to induce observance of Article
111:4 by provincial liquor boards because the Canadian Parliament had
failed to utilize its power to impose discipline on the liquor boards.
185
Canada countered that the determination of what is "reasonable and
available" under Article XXIV: 12 must take into account the domestic legal
and political situation and ultimately should be judged by the contracting
party itself. 86 Similar to the earlier Panel in Canada-Gold Coins, the Panel
concluded that GATT, and not the contracting parties, would be the
ultimate judge of whether reasonable measures had been taken. 18 7 With
respect to whether Canada had, in fact, employed reasonable measures, the
Panel noted that "Canada would have to show that it had made a serious,
persistent and convincing effort to secure compliance by the provincial
liquor boards with the provisions of the General Agreement."' 88 The Panel
concluded that Canada failed to take reasonable measures to ensure
compliance by the provincial liquor boards. 1
89
The last Panel to address Article XXIV: 12 was formed several months
after the United States filed its complaint against Canada in Canada-Import,
In a reversal of roles, Canada requested a GATT panel to address excise
taxes levied on imported beer and wine by United States federal and state
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/canadaalcdistributionll.pdf.
This complaint followed an earlier complaint brought by the European Community against
Canada focusing on substantially similar measures. See Panel on Import, Distribution and
Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, L/6304-35S/37
(March 22, 1988), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/
canadaalcdistribution.pdf.
182 Id. at 1-2.
113 Id. at 19-21, 25-28.
184 Id. at 54-55.
185 Id. at 38.
186 Canada-Import., supra note 181, at 52, 5.35.
187 Id..
188 Id.
189 Id. at 53.
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officials.' 90 The federal government and eighteen states maintained lower
tax rates or tax credits for in-state and domestic brewers.' 9' The Panel
found that the federal and state taxes violated the national treatment
provisions of GATT Article 111:2.192 In contrast to its position as
complainant in the earlier GATT panel, the United States argued that GATT
Article XXIV: 12 could be invoked by countries with federal constitutional
systems as a limitation on their duty to bring local laws into compliance
with GATT.193 Canada argued that the United States had an obligation to
compel local observance of the GATT, relying in part on one scholar's view
that the United States constitutional system allows the federal government
to preempt state law and therefore compel state adherence to GATT.1
94
The Panel first ruled that the United States failed to present an
evidence that reasonable measures were unavailable to it in this case.
More importantly, the Panel concluded that there was no constitutional
impediment to forcing state compliance.
The Panel noted in this respect that both parties agreed that under
United States constitutional law GATT law is part of United States
federal law and, being based on the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution, overrides, as a general matter, inconsistent state law.1
96
The Panel then considered whether United States federal law, including
the GATT, overrides inconsistent state liquor laws in light of the
Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution which grants
substantial regulatory authority over alcoholic beverages to the states.
97
Relying on several decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the
Panel concluded that "the Twenty-first Amendment grants broad police
powers to the states to regulate the distribution and sale of alcoholic
beverages but does not grant the states powers to protect in-state
producers of alcoholic beverages against imports of competing like
products."' 98
190 United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, DS23/R-39S/206
(March 16, 1992), [herinafter Alcoholic and Malt Beverages] available at
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/usmaltbeverages.pdf (last visited Sept. 23,
2004).
'9' Id. at 2-3.
192 Id. at 80-81.
'9' Id. at 54.
194 Id. at 54, citing Hudec, supra note 12.
195 Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, supra note 90, at 79.
196 Id. at 70.
197 Id. at 71.
198 Id.
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Accordingly, the Panel concluded that the United States has not
demonstrated to the Panel that the general obligation of contracting
parties to withdraw measures inconsistent with the General Agreement
cannot be observed in this case by the United States as a result of its
federal constitutional structure and that the conditions for the application
of Article XXIV: 12 are met.1
99
Other than the reference in Canada-Import to "serious, persistent, and
convincing effort, 200 no GATT panel has discussed what constitutes a
"reasonable measure" under Article XXIV: 12. On the other hand, the Panel
decision in United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages makes it clear that with respect to measures "available to"
Members, where the federal government has legal authority it has an
obligation to take some "reasonable measures" to force changes to GATT-
inconsistent measures. No Panel has squarely and definitively addressed
the situation where the federal government does not have legal authority
over an area in which a regional or local government has enacted a non-
conforming measure. The position adopted by the United States in United
States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages highlights the
inconsistency with respect to how U.S. officials view the interaction of
GATT/WTO and state constitutional powers. During consideration of the
Panel report for adoption at the June 1992 Council meeting, the United
States representative stated with respect to the Panel's conclusion that the
U.S. federal structure allows GATT obligations to preempt GATT-
inconsistent state law, that "[w]hile the United States would not oppose
adoption of the Panel report, it would enter for the record a formal
reservation" regarding paragraph 5.80.201 That statement parallels the
United States' position since 1949 which is now codified in the Uru uay
Round agreements implementing legislation and accompanying SAA.
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
As the world trading system opens up to more disciplines and nations,
subnational non-tariff barriers pose an ever increasing challenge to trade
liberalization. Regional and local governments are increasingly engaging
the international system.2 °3 Traditional notions of nation/state sovereignty
are evolving towards greater direct and indirect participation by subnational
governmental units in economic and political matters impacting foreign
'9' Id. at 80.
200 Canada-Import, supra note 181, at 52 and accompanying text.
201 GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX, supra note 140, at 836.
202 SAA, supra note 117 and accompanying text.
203 See Spiro, Globalization supra note 41, at 669.
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affairs.2 °4 This is even true in the United States, where the traditional
exclusive role of the federal government in foreign affairs is being debated
by what many view as a pro-states' rights Supreme Court 20 5 and where
record trade deficits and job losses are re-engaging states in the
international trade debate.20 6 As an economic matter, there is no question
that non-conforming regional and local measures can significantly diminish
the welfare gains sought through greater integration and liberalization of the
world trade system.
While admittedly the GATT/WTO system is not under seige from non-
conforming subnational measures, the ambiguities in the current structure
could lead to significant future problems as regional and local governments
increasingly participate in world trade. Despite the enactment of the
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV in the Uruguay
Round, the issue of subnational compliance with GATT/WTO obligations
remains unclear.20 8 The unresolved ambiguities in Article XXIV:12 are
heightened by the United States' position that its GATT/WTO obligations
do not automatically preempt state law.20 9 There are primarily two ways to
address and reform the current GATT/WTO regulatory framework.
The first, and more invasive, approach focuses on the WTO and its
mechanism for regulating regional and local governments. This "outside-
in" approach calls for an amendment to Article XXIV: 12 in order to
strengthen its compliance obligations, and requires broad support because it
is subject to the WTO amendment procedures.2 10 The primary model for
the amendment is the federal clause contained in NAFTA Article 105,
which provides that "[t]he Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures
are taken in order to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement,
including their observance, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement,
by state and provincial governments."2 ' Article 105 derives from Article
103 of the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement ("CFTA"). 212
Unlike the Uruguay Round and NAFTA implementing legislation and
SAA, the CFTA implementing legislation explicitly states that the CFTA
204 Id. at 668-669.
205 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
206 See supra note 9.
207 See Matthew Schaefer, Searching for Pareto Gains in the Relationship Between Free
Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23 CAN-U.S. L.J. 441,448-
49(1997).
208 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
210 WTO, supra note 20, art. X.
211 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Art. 105, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA] (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) (emphasis added).
212 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987 and Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-
Can., art. 103, 27 I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter CFTA].
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prevails over any conflicting state or local law, including laws in the area of
insurance.213 The text of the CFTA itself specifically outlines the areas
where the CFTA does not prevail over state and provincial measures,
214including certain alcohol distribution practices.
The "all necessary measures" language in NAFTA Article 105
arguably eliminates the ambiguities of the "reasonable measures" language
in GATT Article XXIV: 12. While no dispute resolution panel has
reviewed the CFTA or NAFTA federal clauses, the "all necessary
measures" language can reasonably be interpreted to impose a requirement
on federal states to do whatever it takes within its constitutional authority to
ensure state compliance.21 6 Indeed, during the NAFTA debate, concern was
voiced by "labor, environmental, and constitutional conservatives" that the
"all necessary measures" language of NAFTA Article 105 created a greater
preemptive effect on state laws than the "reasonable measures" language of
GATT Article XXIV12.217  In response to these concerns, the NAFTA
implementing legislation and accompanying SAA characterize the language
of NAFTA as an international obligation which does not automatically
preempt state law.218 Similar language was included in the Uruguay Round
implementing legislation and SAA.21
Despite the various assurances by the United States federal
government of their non-preemptive effect on state laws, NAFTA and
GATT/WTO are international agreements forming part of federal law in
the United States, and as such create binding obligations on behalf of the
federal government. While some WTO Members (particularly non-federal
Members) would likely support an amendment to strengthen GATT Article
XXIV: 12 in order to further clarify the obligation of federal states, any
amendment would likely face an uphill battle in the United States.
Notwithstanding the resurgence in debate over state participation in foreign
affairs, the current political climate is quite simply too volatile to win
support for any amendment requiring the federal government to take more
213 See JUDITH H. BELLO & ALAN F. HOLMER, GUIDE TO THE U.S.-CANADA FREE-TRADE
AGREEMENT 354-55 (1990).
214 Id. at 355.
215 See Sarah M. Vogel, The Effects of NAFTA Upon North Dakota State Law, 70 N.D. L.
REV. 485,489(1994).
216 See Cooper, supra note 12, at 157-58; Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA:
Marrying Effective Dispute Settlement and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L. J.
216,250 (1995).
217 Vogel, supra note 215, at 489. The debate was focused primarily on the GATT
Panel's conclusion in United States: Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
supra note 190 and accompanying text.
218 NAFTA, Statement of Administrative Action, H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 50, 154 (1993).
219 See supra note 117.
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drastic measures to ensure state observance.
More importantly, even if the "all necessary measures" language of
NAFTA Article 105 was adopted, at the end of the day, federal states may
simply be unwilling or unable to press regional and local territories into
compliance. For example, what if the subject matter of the measure falls
within the exclusive constitutional authority of the regional or local
government? Is the central government required to alter its constitutional
structure to ensure observance? One can certainly argue that such a drastic
measure could be considered a "necessary measure" under the language of
NAFTA Article 105. It is practically unimaginable that a sovereign nation
would alter its constitution to conform to obligations contained in an
international treaty. If that were a realistic interpretation of the obligation
under any federal clause, it is very likely that no sovereign nations would
choose to participate in the international agreement.
This gap in the federal clauses of both GATT/WTO and NAFTA
essentially leads to an "efficient breach" situation where the federal state is
forced to accept the penalties associated with violation of its international
agreement because it has no legitimate reasonable or necessary measures
available to ensure observance of the agreement at the local level. While
the "efficient breach" option may make sense politically for federal states, it
does not serve the greater purpose of trade liberalization. Negatively
affected Members are forced to devote resources to address non-conforming
measures in the WTO dispute settlement process. The non-conforming
measures are more appropriately addressed domestically by the offending
Member as opposed to the supranational organization in Geneva.
The second, and less invasive, approach is the "inside-out" approach
which maintains the current language of Article XXIV: 12 while re-
engaging and re-energizing regional and local governments in the trade
process at the domestic level. The main goal of this approach is to decrease
the potential for regional and local non-conforming measures through
greater domestic education, participation and administration in the
international trade system. Areas of direct and indirect involvement
include: (1) increased input into trade negotiations; (2) increased
involvement in the development of implementing legislation; and (3) a
larger role in the administration of the trade disciplines implicating regional
and local measures.2 2 °
The United States adopted a formal domestic regulatory framework for
state education and participation in international trade. The regulatory
mechanism is the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee
("IGPAC"), which consists of approximately thirty-five members
220 See Schaefer, supra note 7, at 137.
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representing the states and various other non-federal entities. 22' The
IGPAC was initially created in the 1974 Trade Act and is charged to work
directly with the Office of the United States Trade Representative "to
provide overall policy advice on trade policy matters that have a significant
relationship to the affairs of state and local governments within the
jurisdiction of the United States. 222 In addition to IGPAC, and because of
the large number of subfederal units in the United States, many national
associations representing the collective interests of all fifty states submit
223policy statements and proposals directly to the federal government. For
example, the National Governors Association adopted the Governors'
Principles on International Trade Policy which broadly sets forth the views
of the National Governors Association on the current trade agenda.224
While there has been no comprehensive analysis of the efficacy of this
or similar domestic frameworks for regional and local participation, it has
worked well in the United States with respect to areas such as the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary, Technical Barriers to Trade and Government
Procurement disciplines, each of which implicates state governments. For
example, with respect to the side agreement on Government Procurement,
the United States was able to secure voluntary commitments from 37 state
governments through the consent of their governors.22 5  However, this
approach has not operated without complaint. On March 12, 2004 the
IGPAC submitted its report on the proposed United States-Australia Free
Trade Agreement. In addition to expressing its general support for the
proposed FTA, the IGPAC seized the opportunity to express its
221 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Charter of the
Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on Trade, enacted pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
2155(c)(2), as amended, available at http://www.ustr.gov/outreach/igpacharter.pdf (last
visited on March 15, 2004). As of March, 2004 the IGPAC roster consisted of 41 members
representing a broad spectrum of state interests.
A similar advisory committee worked extremely well during the negotiations on the North
American Free Trade Agreement where the Office of the United States Trade Representative
appointed a "NAFTA coordinator for state matters." See Schaefer, supra note 7. The
NAFTA implementing legislation and SAA grants the states, for the first time, a guaranteed
right to be informed and to participate in trade matters affecting the states. Id. The Uruguay
Round implementing legislation and SAA follows suit and names a "WTO Coordinator for
state matters."
222 Id
223 See Schaefer, supra note 7.
224 National Governors Association, Governors' Principles on International Trade
Policy, § 11, available at http:/Avww.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,CPOLICY_
POSITIONAD_506,00.html (last visited on February 5, 2004).
225 See Schaefer, supra note 207, at 471. The federal government used a voluntary
approach whereby states did not have to decide under an "all or nothing" commitment, but
rather could choose the state entities that would be bound. Id. The bound entities are listed
in a commitment schedule in Annex 2 to the Government Procurement Code.
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dissatisfaction with the current method of obtaining state support in areas
within their constitutional authority.
Statutes and regulations that states and local governments have validly
adopted, that are constitutional, and that reflect locally appropriate
responses to the needs of our residents, should not be overridden by
provisions in trade agreements. These concerns were reflected by
Congress' inclusion of the "no greater rights" language in Trade
Promotion Authority legislation. The principle that the United States
may request, but not require, states to alter their regulatory regimes in
areas over which they hold constitutional authority should be
maintained. Full and effective coordination and consultation should
include requesting authority from the appropriate state or local authority
before a state or local rule, regulation, or statute is listed in a trade
agreement, offer or other binding commitment. IGPAC would prefer a
process that relies upon affirmative, informed consent from affected
state and local entities, rather than negative opt-out.
226
As noted by the IGPAC report, the "inside-out" informal approach
limits local input to non-binding advice and a single "opt-out" choice. An
additional problem is that this approach leads to an inefficient, piecemeal
commitment in schedules that are difficult even for practitioners to digest.
To the extent that this framework could be strengthened to allow subfederal
units to offer informed consent or binding advice with respect to
commitments in areas constitutionally allocated to them, it could serve as a
model approach not only for the United States but also for other federal
states. This approach will be particularly useful if the WTO seriously
intends to reach a single commitment or undertaking in areas such as
services that are highly regulated at the local level. Finally, many have
criticized the United States' framework for federal-state consultation as
really nothing more than window dressing, with serious consultations rarely
occurring. The IGPAC has called for a fully funded, "regularly scheduled
mechanism for US federal-state trade policy consultations in light of the
increasing state role in trade policy formulation, negotiation and dispute,,227
resolution. While most Americans dare not support the creation of
additional bureaucratic infrastructure, this is one area where a firm structure
could reap dividends both politically and economically.
226 Report of the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee on the US-Australia Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) 2 (Mar. 12, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/
Australia/advisor/igpac.pdf.
227 Id. at 7.
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VII. CONCLUSION
To the extent international trade debate continues to focus primarily on
trade issues at the international and national levels, subnational barriers to
trade may remain more of an academic exercise to ponder for later days.
However, if the multilateral trade process gets back on track with increasing
trade liberalization and commitment of more disciplines to the world
trading system, subnational barriers to trade will increase and may be the
last bastion of protectionism in a world where virtually all goods and
services are committed to tariff bindings and international regulations. At
that time, the WTO system will require a formal, efficient and effective
process for ensuring regional and local compliance with GATT/WTO
obligations. Whether that process assumes the form of national regulatory
institutions allowing for internal regional and local participation, or an
international regulatory framework imposing stricter requirements on
federal states to force subnational compliance, remains to be seen.
